I promised I'd post it on here when it was complete, and I'm now fulfilling my promise. Tell me what you guys think.

The title of my paper: "Saturday Night Plights"





Somehow, somewhere down the line, something went gravely wrong.
The 2005 season was to be one to remember, not just for the University of Southern California, but for the nation. Fresh off an undefeated season and their second national championship in two years, the Trojan football team was poised for success on a dynastic scale. Star quarterback Matt Leinart and star running back Reggie Bush led a dynamic offense that steamrolled the opposition’s defense. The offensive line was a mature, cohesive unit, and sophomore wide receivers Dwayne Jarrett and Steve Smith, both prized recruits, added to the firepower. The defense had lost several veteran players to the NFL draft, but remained a talented unit.
The hype machine slowly gathered steam. SportsCenter, ESPN’s daily sports news program, began comparing the 2005 Trojans to some of college football’s most legendary teams in an attempt to answer the question of whether or not the 2005 Trojans were the best college football team ever. Both Bush and Leinart were Heisman Trophy finalists, with Bush taking home the trophy for the best college football player. Both Bush and Leinart were locks to become high NFL draft picks with eight figures of guaranteed money comfortably within their reach—not even mentioning the endorsement deals possible.
Where did it all come apart at the seams?
The Rose Bowl may not have been the starting point, but its impact may have been a key contributor. The heavily-favored Trojans were upset by the Texas Longhorns in college football’s national championship game, dashing hopes of a perfect season and a national title.
Charlie Robinson, a writer for Yahoo! Sports, pushed that point back further. Last week, Robinson came out with allegations that Reggie Bush’s mother, stepfather, and siblings lived in a house owned by a man starting up a sports marketing agency, with the goal of signing Reggie as the central client to the company’s success. The allegations include a questionable deal regarding the house’s rent, as well as a solid bit of concrete evidence: “The Griffins ‘05” (Griffin is the name of Bush’s stepfather, to whom his mother is married) is set in the driveway’s cement (Robinson). Under National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) rule, players and their families are not to receive any extra benefits that would not be open to students who are not members of the school’s athletics programs. These allegations, found days before the NFL draft, supposedly did not influence the Houston Texans, who held the number one pick and opted for North Carolina State defensive end Mario Williams instead of Bush, who was picked second by the New Orleans Saints. Matt Leinart’s draft stock also fell, and he found himself an Arizona Cardinal, selected 10th overall.
With one stitch broken, others are rapidly pulling apart. Matt Leinart, in order to escape the stress of dealing with his numerous rabid fans at USC, was living in an off-campus apartment with Dwayne Jarrett. The rent was all paid for by Leinart’s father—including Jarrett’s share of the rent, which has prompted an NCAA investigation into similar territory with the Bush case: an ineligible benefit for a student unavailable to other students and student-athletes and not provided by a family member (WR Jarrett Under Investigation). Yet, all the allegations of player benefits may just be the tip of a very threatening iceberg. Mark Sanchez was a highly-touted recruit who was expected to become Matt Leinart’s heir apparent. In recent days, he’s been the heir apparent of $200,000 bail money to free himself after an arrest stemming from a sexual assault charge.
These allegations may threaten to dismantle the legacy of the team thought to be the greatest college football team ever. If Reggie Bush’s parents are found to have committed acts inexcusable by the NCAA, he would be deemed an ineligible player from the time the rent bills stopped coming. This could cost USC their 2004 national championship season—a perfect season—and the Pacific-10 Conference Title, which would go to the University of Oregon. Reggie Bush stands a chance at becoming the only college football player ever to have the Heisman Trophy taken away, an ignominious fall from grace for one of the most lauded players in recent college football history. The investigation into Dwayne Jarrett’s rent payments is the freshest of the new scandals, and the effects from that scandal are as of yet unknown.
In the minds of the cynical and knowledgeable in the realm of college football, one question immediately comes to mind: what else has USC kept hidden from view? The answer may never be fully known, but the football program may have a lot to answer to. As of right now, there is no link between USC and the Bush and Jarrett cases indicating possible program involvement, which would lead to massive NCAA violations
and punishments. Worse still, the floodgates may open with further reports of shady dealings between college football programs and the athletes who play for them. Corruption in amateur sport has become almost commonplace, and some of the biggest names in the nation have been deemed guilty of the biggest offenses. Baseball has steroids, basketball has marijuana, hockey has gambling, and now college football has skirting of eligibility rules and financial rules as the defining scandals of recent years. The USC affairs are simply a microcosm of the problems surrounding college football programs in today’s era.
In recent years, watching perennial powers and big-name institutions getting caught red-handed in an attempt to gain an edge has become a spectator sport. Negative
press has led to mud-slinging, which in turn leads to retaliatory shots fired across all sides. This cannot continue to be the case. NCAA restrictions are set in place for a very
clear purpose and such defiance is harmful to the universities caught in the act and the public caught in the crossfire. College football is somehow losing its way, and with player allegations of illegal gifts such as cash and cars and shady deals brokered during recruiting visits coming to light more frequently in recent years, a greater investigation into this big-money pastime must occur to keep corruption out.
To understand why this is even an issue is to understand the concept of eligibility. Consider the case of Jeremy Bloom, a wide receiver at Colorado and recent draft pick of the Philadelphia Eagles. Bloom is also a champion moguls skier who was a member of the U.S. Olympic team in Turin, Italy. A couple of years ago, Bloom went before the NCAA, college football’s governing body, to ask if he could accept skiing sponsorships
while being allowed to continue to play football. In a statement released on August 17, 2004, he was denied by the NCAA. The justification: “The NCAA student-athlete reinstatement staff has determined that Jeremy Bloom of the University of Colorado, Boulder, rendered himself permanently ineligible for intercollegiate athletics with multiple and willful violations of NCAA rules regarding endorsements” (“NCAA statement…”, par. 1). The NCAA vice-president for membership services, Kevin Lennon, commented further in the statement by asserting that “…he entered into contracts to endorse products, in violation of NCAA rules” (“NCAA statement…” par. 3). From the example with Jeremy Bloom, eligibility is clearly defined as being on a level playing field with every other athlete on the field. Since Bloom’s endorsements are not available to every collegiate athlete, he cannot receive them unless he shares them with the thousands of student athletes across the nation, which surely he has no desire to do. The basic principle of eligibility is closely guarded by the NCAA.
All college football infractions are violations of the NCAA rulebook, designed to encourage amateurism in handling student athletes in the sense that athletics are nothing more than an additional extracurricular activity and athletes should not be given exclusive benefits for their participation in the program. The NCAA’s official governing rulebook contains specific bylaws towards conducting an athletics program, divided up into articles (three separate rulebooks are used: one for Divisions I-A and I-AA, one for Division II, and one for Division III). Article 16, in particular, is entitled “Awards, Benefits, and Expenses for Enrolled Student-Athletes”—that upon which several of college football’s largest scandals have violated portions of. The opening sentence of Article 16.01.1 (“Eligibility Effect of Violation”) states, flatly and firmly, “A student-athlete shall not receive any extra benefit.”

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Benefits, in turn, are defined in Article 16.02.3 as “…a special arrangement by an institutional employee or a representative of an institution’s athletics department to provide a student-athlete or a student-athlete’s relative or friend a benefit not expressly authorized by NCAA legislation” (NCAA 221-223). Students who violate rules by accepting benefits are henceforth “ineligible in all sports”—at least, those governed by NCAA rules. The cases against Dwayne Jarrett and Reggie Bush’s family involve Article 16.11.1.1 (“General Rule”), which simply states that “Receipt of a benefit…by student-athletes, their relatives, or friends is not a violation of NCAA rules if it is demonstrated that the same benefit is generally available to the institution’s students and their relatives or friends” (NCAA 233-235). While Reggie Bush may be acquitted of violating that rule if USC had no prior knowledge of the courtship of Bush by his family’s landlord, he may still be subject to Article 16.11.1.3 (“Loan from an Established Family Friend”) (NCAA 233-235). Such loans as mentioned in the title of an article are permissible if it does not have any basis upon athletics, which, considering that Reggie Bush’s family allegedly accepted $100,000 from the owner of a sports marketing company, may hurt his chances of a clean resolution. He is effectively boxed into a corner—with his parents having effectively taken the six-figure payment at his behest, he will have a difficult time establishing his eligibility if the allegations are all true. If not, he’ll have to contend with Article 12 (“Amateurism”), which allows eligibility for only “amateur student-athlete[s]”. Eligibility is then lost through “use of his or her athletic skill…for pay in any form in that sport” (Article 12.1.1) (NCAA 69-70). Hence, the notion of athletic competition as extra-curricular is born…and subsequently challenged or defied.
The NCAA Division I Rulebook reserves Article 13 for the sole purpose of discussing recruiting rules and violations. The recruiting process regarding high school football players is designed to be stringent—colleges cannot touch a player until he has completed his junior year of high school, and are limited to who can contact a prospective recruit. Article 13.2.2 specifically mentions prohibited gifts that may be presented to students, including cash, services or lodging at free or reduced cost, and “any tangible items”, such as that beautiful new Escalade sitting on the lot of the university booster’s dealership (NCAA 102-103). Article 13.6 covers a crucial element to recruiting: campus visits, which give recruits great perspective on where their playing career will take shape. Colleges are only allowed one paid recruiting visit to a campus and a maximum of five visits per recruit to any campus they wish to peruse. There is room for fun, though: “An institution may provide entertainment, which may not be excessive” (NCAA 109-112).
Often times, schools are getting more creative in recruiting…with NCAA rules adapting to meet up with the growing trend. Article 13.4.1.2 in the NCAA Division 1 Rulebook (“Electronic Transmissions”) shines light on a growing trend in collegiate recruiting. The article states that “electronically transmitted correspondence (e.g., electronic mail, Instant Messenger, facsimiles, text messaging) may be sent to a prospect” (NCAA 106) and not counted against the restricted number of phone calls, thus granting some breathing room to recruiting staffs determined to keep up the pressure. Sometimes, colleges go to even further extremes to recruit players. Take the case of Mitch Mustain, a quarterback from Springdale High School in Arkansas who was named Gatorade National Player of the Year in 2005. After pulling his commitment from the University of Arkansas, the school he originally chose, MSNBC.com reported that “around the time Mustain reopened his recruitment, (Arkansas head coach Houston) Nutt was making staff changes. For the first time, he hired an offensive coordinator. The choice: Gus Malzahn, Mustain’s coach at Springdale” (“Mustain…” ). Nothing like a little touch of home to bring someone closer. Hiring Gus Malzahn to sway a top recruit didn’t just turn out to be a good decision for the Razorbacks, though; it turned out to be a great one. MSNBC.com adds that “receiver Andrew Norman committed to the Razorbacks early, and since Malzahn was hired, a pair of Springdale recruits...have switched from Florida to Arkansas” (“Mustain”, par. 15). Hiring someone with the potential to sway a top recruit is not an illegal practice in the Division I ranks; rather, it’s one that can be sought after to attract recruits. Recent hires such as Charlie Weis at Notre Dame and Steve Spurrier at Florida are classic examples, due to Weis’ work as the offensive mind behind the New England Patriots’ three Super Bowl Championships and Steve Spurrier’s familiarity to the program, having had a successful previous stint in the late ‘90s. Creative means for recruiting can lead to dividends for some college football teams, along with further interest for stirring up even more interest. In this way, it’s a glorious cycle.
Once a violation is reported or discovered, and any further investigation has been undertaken, punishment comes into question. Tom Farrey is a senior writer for ESPN.com who wrote, among various college football web articles, a multi-part examination of NCAA punishment called Death of The Penalty in November 2004. He
highlights four major penalties the NCAA infractions committee (in charge of handling punishment) can levy if it so chooses: scholarship cuts (reducing the number of potential
recruits a school may have), television bans (effectively reducing exposure and money), bowl bans (another measure aimed at reducing exposure and money as punishment), and the “death penalty”, the most infamous penalty ever handed down to a collegiate football program. The death penalty calls for the abolishment of the program for two years, where it may be reinstated, and has been handed down once in the last 20 years (“How To Take Punishment Like a Champ”, par. 1-7), a shockingly low number considering the various violations committed.
Amidst the strict rules and constricting punishments, college football scandals appear to run rampant, with many well-publicized accounts of recruiting and gift violations springing up in recent years. Colorado’s program has taken a major hit after allegations surfaced that players hired strippers and escort services for recruiting parties saturated in booze and sex. USAToday.com reports that in 2001, several women came out to admit that they were raped by football players at CU recruiting parties, although no actual criminal charges have ever been filed (O’Driscoll, par.4). Regardless, the information led to an NCAA investigation and a criminal investigation, costing coach Gary Barnett and school president Betsy Hoffman their jobs.
Barnett claimed innocence regarding what went on at recruiting parties, but such a strategy could backfire. The NCAA launched an investigation in 2004 into Maurice Clarett, a star running back who was the focal point of Ohio State’s national championship season in 2002, and his coach at Ohio State, Jim Tressel, after Clarett was found to have had use of a car from a booster’s used-car lot, as reported by Tom Farrey in a report entitled Souls of the Departed Haunt Youngstown. Farrey’s report showcased a
disturbing trend following Jim Tressel regarding his football programs and illegal booster payments dating back to his career at Youngstown State (OH), where he won multiple national championships…while Mickey Monus, owner of the Phar-Mor drugstore chain
that is now defunct after cooking its books Enron-style, was paying the star players on the team to appease them. Farrey continues to say that the disrespect for basic regulations was mutual: “Youngstown State’s internal investigation was a sham. So
little diligence went into pursuit of truth that (Youngstown State athletic director) Malmisur never confronted Monus with the allegations, nor did Tressel” (Farrey, par. 12-40). Heaven forbid that a football powerhouse such as Ohio State, with four 1st-round draft choices in the 2006 NFL draft, have to carry forth with the tradition of complying with the NCAA.

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Illegal funding of players doesn’t have to stop at booster payments. In 1995, the University of Miami (FL) went before the NCAA infractions committee amidst accusations of “improperly calculating off-campus room and board stipends for 141 football [players] and…other athletes” (Farrey, “Football Sanctions”, par. 43-45) to the tune of $412,000, amounting to just under $3,000 in extra financial aid per player. A year later, agents seeking to represent Florida State University football players treated several players to a “$6,000 shopping spree at a Foot Locker store” (Farrey, “Football Sanctions”, par. 37-39). While the school was not given any major penalties, Steve Spurrier, rival head coach with the University of Florida, infamously attached the nickname “Free Shoes University” upon the school. Spurrier, Farrey points out, has had his own brushes with the infractions committee, after angrily criticizing a one-year bowl ban given to Florida for an illegal payment by Spurrier’s predecessor, Galen Hall, for a defensive back’s child support bill (“Football Sanctions”, par. 82-84).
Such illegal payments are closer to home than the average college football fan might imagine. In USAToday.com, Patrick O’Driscoll and Erik Brady cite a 2002 allegation against the University of Oregon as a prime example of the underlying corruption involved in recruiting practices, where running back Lynell Hamilton reported that “he was offered alcohol, marijuana, and sex at a recruiting party” (par. 17). Oregon State’s reputation, meanwhile, is taking a hit with a new book detailing booster payments to players and the use of sex appeal to allure recruits. Esera Tuaolo, a defensive lineman who played in the NFL for nine years, recounts in his memoir Alone in the Trenches: My
Life as a Gay Man in the NFL players being handed $10 and $20 bills from athletics supporters and recalls being offered money repeatedly, which he declined. Esera also mentions in the book players receiving big-screen televisions from boosters, as well as two attractive women who showed him around campus (Tuaolo 47-53). The concept of “everybody’s doing it” appears to have claimed eminent domain upon college football illegalities, and residents of the state of Oregon can also see these infractions on display.
All of the activity in skirting NCAA payment rules sits in the shadow of the most threatening scandal an NCAA infractions committee has ever presided over. Southern Methodist University incurred the wrath of the NCAA in 1987 in a college football
scandal that set the precedent for punishment of a big program. Investigators discovered that, while on probation for previous offenses, Southern Methodist boosters created a
slush fund worth $61,000, accessible to football players for whatever their needs may be.
According to Tom Farrey, SMU was aware of the slush fund and its use for players’ benefit. The NCAA, in turn, cracked down on Southern Methodist, canceling the 1987 season, limiting the 1988 season to 7 road games, and instituting two-year bowl and television bans. Players from the SMU football team were allowed to transfer to other schools without having to sit out a year as NCAA rules traditionally require. While the death penalty was not fully enforced, Farrey notes (the full death penalty requires two years of cancellation), SMU officials cancelled the 1988 season due to the crippling restrictions. At the time, SMU’s football team was nationally prominent; it has failed to recover from the death penalty and return to prominence (par. 49-52).
After releasing the death penalty upon Southern Methodist, college football’s ultimate punishment has been treated like the atomic bomb—a weapon too deadly to be unleashed with too much regularity. In response, the NCAA hasn’t used it since, in the face of glaringly obvious violators. Alabama has found itself infamous for avoiding the death penalty after a booster paid $115,000 to two high school coaches for them to steer a prized recruit, defensive end Albert Means, to Alabama. Eligible for the death penalty, the NCAA opted instead for five years of probation and a two-year bowl ban with scholarship cuts (Farrey, “Football Sanctions”, par. 1-3). (The Means case is the prototype of an ethical nightmare; Means reportedly had no knowledge whatsoever of the brokered deal and was shipped to Alabama for almost the sole purpose of his coach’s greed.) Kansas State’s citation in 1999 of improper booster payments was the third such incident in six years, but the NCAA opted not to impose any penalties, citing “the quality of the school’s self-investigation” (Farrey, “Football Sanctions”, par. 75-78). The incident involving the improper child support payment at the University of Florida also was a death penalty case.
NCAA appears to have found a new target for punishment: smaller schools. Tom Farrey reveals that, in the report “‘Not the Kind of Place Looking to Cheat’”, “[From] 1996, the only teams given bans on playing postseason games for rules violations are Bethune-Cookman, Cal State-Northridge, Texas A&M-Kingsville and Albany State -- each members of either Division I-AA or Division II. There have been no associated television bans in part because, well, none play regularly on television” (par. 1-8). The NCAA is coming down hard on small college football programs violating the rules, creating firestorms about the overzealousness of such investigations compared with that of a Division I investigation.
Innumerable speculation on the NCAA’s ulterior motives may come into play, but the issue of tackling corruption amongst colleges has to be the first and foremost issue dealt with. The amounts of money involved in corruption scandals are often staggering, making the roots of the issue often very difficult to directly attack. Legal money that is up for grabs for universities is seemingly limitless as it is. J. Douglas Toma, director of the University of Pennsylvania Center for Higher Education Management within Pennsylvania’s Graduate School of Education, conducted a study in 2003 of 11 major college football programs, compiling his findings into a book entitled Football U. “In Baton Rouge,” Toma writes, “LSU (Louisiana State University) football athletics generates $65 million in sales for local firms, supports 1,616 jobs in the area, and provides $25.5 million in household earnings” (265). In addition to that, “…the economic impact of Penn State football on the State College community was $5.7 million per game ($40.3 million per season)” (265-266). These numbers are so large, it’s almost gaudy. With that much money in play every Saturday, it is no small wonder why Division I schools such as LSU or Penn State would try and increase their market share—even if whatever means necessary have to be implemented.
However unwilling the populace may be to support the athletic team, indirect cost factors in heavily. Personal experience shows that the collegiate experience is often capped off with the purchase of attire bearing the school’s logo and colors. That extends to the endless T-shirts received over the years and a license plate frame hanging on the back of the family vehicle. In 1994, Toma announces, “college athletics accounted for $2.5 billion in licensing” (Toma 263). That figure not only transcends millions, but is likely to have increased since with the popularity of college football video games, apparel, and other marketing devices.
So, with all that money, the logical solution is that colleges are acting like oil companies, raking in massive profits to lavish on their athletic programs in hopes of continued success. Not so, counters Toma: “…the average Division I-A athletics program (schools with football teams) had revenues of $15.55 million in 1995 ($14.1 million excluding direct support from the institution) and expenses of $14.3 million” (Toma 265). Those figures do not seem to be a huge factor, but consider this: “Only 41 athletic departments at Division I football schools did better than breaking even in 1995
(only 31 made more than $1 million), while 62 suffered a loss” (Toma 265). Suddenly, the question of how much money is made through athletics takes on a more complicated stance. It does appear, however, that while millions of dollars are to be made, schools, already fairly tight with money, have the means to do whatever it takes to get it. The best way: bolster the athletic program as much as possible. The dollar amounts featured in
many scandals rarely break into the tens of thousands, much less the hundreds of thousands.
Cleaning up a program is much easier, however, when willing participants are involved; getting those participants to be willing can be an entirely frustrating manner. Toma quotes a faculty member from LSU as saying that “…we pretty much ride on the coattails of winning” (184). He points out later that “…teams and games have the rare power to make people feel good about both themselves and the institutions they support” (Toma 250). With all the good emotions attached to winning, an honest self-investigation policy appears to be a pipe dream. Players who receive boosters’ benefits would see no reason to complain. And why should they, with free products coming their way? Coaches and athletic directors can be equally uncooperative, primarily for the bad press that the football team is receiving. J. Douglas Toma proposes an interesting exercise in Football U.: name three things about Florida State University without mentioning athletics at any point (175). Safe to say, few outside of alumni can do that without preparation. Cooperation with the NCAA on rule infractions becomes a far more daunting task once the financial and emotional stakes are fully realized.

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What players and athletics departments get out of illegal recruiting tactics and gifts is fairly obvious, but what’s in it for the boosters supplying the cash? The answer may lie in a 1994 infraction Tom Farrey cites regarding the University of Washington. Fresh off a national championship the previous year, an NCAA investigation uncovered a payment of $50,000 to star quarterback Billy Joe Hobert based on his “’pro potential’” (“Football Sanctions…”, par. 51-54). The logical thinking behind “pro potential” is that, somewhere down the line, the player in question will grow famous and, in return for the compensation of the past, provide boosters with legal benefits later on. Thanks to the rising popularity of the recruiting process and football in general, young stars are identified early (like Maurice Clarett, as mentioned above) and become early targets for boosters to influence.
Of course, while willingness is often a huge question, many players and programs openly defy the rules through working sanctions in their favor. Tom Farrey, in “How to Take Punishment Like a Champ”, put the spotlight on five techniques that schools use to help beat NCAA sanctions: fire the coach, seek a quick resolution, bolster recruiting,
“cultivate walk-ons”, and spread out the penalty to minimize the impact. By firing the
coach and seeking a quick resolution, colleges hope to make the people (and potential recruits) forget just how bad a situation was that it required sanctions. To make the best of a bad situation, colleges will often use the available resources to seek out better recruits and mine for walk-on talent, while spreading out the penalty can allow for strength of a program to be fairly well maintained (par. 1-21). Scholarship cuts, a popular penalty with the NCAA infractions committee, can have a minimized effect in
this fashion. Competitiveness has encouraged creativity in finding solutions for the problems associated with NCAA sanctions and football programs across the country.
When that fails to satisfy, colleges find themselves content with attacking the very notion of a just NCAA punishment. Tom Farrey’s report in 2004 includes this biting story of the Michigan State football program:
In 1996, upon finding that the team’s academic advisor had submitted phony papers, pressured teachers and helped players acquire grade changes, Michigan State considered self-imposing a one-year bowl ban. The Spartans decided against it and took their chances before the NCAA infractions committee.
Michigan State received no bowl ban, and the scholarship loss was only nine spread over two recruiting years—nothing that new coach Nick Saban couldn’t navigate around. Michigan State president Peter McPherson announced, “Ladies and gentlemen, the process worked” (“NCAA’s Once-Rabid…”, par. 61-62)
All of a sudden, the NCAA seems vulnerable—for all the wrong reasons. Such zealotry is publicly embarrassing—especially considering the age of the case and the current reputation of the infractions committee. Insulting as it is for a punishment to be taken lightly, taking the punisher lightly should be painful in such a way that reform is required.
In order to truly make an impact, the NCAA needs to hit colleges hard and in the right place: in their wallets. Hit offending colleges with automatic fines and a fee for conducting the investigation. Hit them with television bans that can extend as long as five years in order to raise the attention of the nation. Hit them with consistent scholarship and financial penalties that make coaches and athletic directors alike quiver. To make the punishments count, keep track of every college on probation or under sanctions. If death is so undesirable, then living hell should be a significant wake-up call.
It is clear that colleges make a mockery of the NCAA’s infractions committee anymore, so the NCAA should begin to be taken more seriously. There are millions of dollars to be made in college football, and colleges and the boosters who help supply them have proven to do anything it takes to get them. Those who enjoy college football do not want to see a product corrupted by institutions with manipulation and profit as key goals.




For the record, this comes out to 18 pages on Microsoft Word.

Tell me how I did.

Holy shit . I do a page and a half report and call it a "C-"


Good work. I read most of it.

The requirement was 3,000 words. This paper falls just shy of 5,000.

Thanks, Anthony.

Edited to mention that the paper was double-spaced. Hence, the 18 pages.

So now we're back to posts being limited?

I guess I don't do the long posts anymore, but it still sucks for people that post articles and stuff.

Is it fixable or not?

I just got the grade back on it. I got 1800 out of 2000 possible--a 90% A.

I am elated.

So now we're back to posts being limited?

I guess I don't do the long posts anymore, but it still sucks for people that post articles and stuff.

Is it fixable or not?

Yeah, 10000 words is the limit

Fixable though.

That part in the middle was sweet.

I'm related to someone who lost an NCAA championship (not football) owing to rules violations by a teammate. The specific rules that were violated were rewritten because they were unclear two years after the "violation" occured, then were retroactively applied. The teammate violated the rules by playing in an all-proceeds-go-to-charity exhibition with pros in a foreign country where the country's distinction between "amateur" and "pro" was hazy. Most of the players deemed to be "pro players" were playing for teams with "amateur" as part of their name, the teammate didn't speak enough English at the time to really make the fine-line distinction the NCAA wanted him to make regarding his activities, and he didn't actually derive profit beyond a charity team uniform.

So, I have some bias here.

For those who think the NCAA should impose "purity" to the sport of football, how much should that cost you? What % of your hard-earned tax dollars should be funding athletic programs, and for what reason? To what extent should sports programs at colleges be independent business units? When U-Michigan makes $4 million in net profit for every home football game just from ticket revenue alone, why not make them a state-funded business, and pay players as if they were employees? Face it, the kids getting most of the attention aren't playing because of the spirit of amateurism as true student athletes, but because the NFL has successfully lawyered its under-21 ban and there's no "minor league" like baseball (gotta love their Sherman Antitrust Act status). If the NCAA imposes the death penalty and tuitions and taxes go up more than they would otherwise, was what the NCAA did worthwhile?

When U-Michigan makes $4 million in net profit for every home football game just from ticket revenue alone, why not make them a state-funded business, and pay players as if they were employees?

I think running it this way would favor the bigger stadium teams and the more prestigious schools (UM, USC, UCLA), while schools like Colorado State and Louisville would just fall by the wayside. Then you'd have a Yankees/Red Sox v. rest of MLB situation. I also think the competition would suffer because kids would just follow money to be a bench warmer instead of starting for their favorite in-state team.

Keep in mind there's real taxpayer dollars involved in most cases, either directly or indirectly. What do you want those taxpayer dollars to do?

Do you treat it as amateur sport when there's so much money involved, where there's a ton of decisions made that are bottom-line oriented, like extending the # of games/season or paying stupid $ for a coach? How much professionalism should you tolerate when the proceeds from these big football programs often fund sports that are truly amateur sports no one will pay the $ for otherwise?

I think it's more a question of spending the money WISELY. Granted, the NCAA may charge its member schools more, which in turn would come back down on to the students. The ramifications of financial accountability would be huge.

But is it worth it? I think so.

I just got the grade back on it. I got 1800 out of 2000 possible--a 90% A.

I am elated.
congrats :D

is there any particular reason this here? i mean, can we put this in the NCAA forum for all to read? if Unibomber wants to keep it here, then that's his choice, of course :)

But is it worth it? I think so.

I may not have put in the research into the subject that some of you have, but this would probably be the first time in history that inserting vast sums of money into something actually helped the situation.

In most academic university departments, teaming up with corporations is the norm and such synergies are strongly encouraged. Universities don't have to fund everything themselves, so they can do more, different things. Working with champions of industry demonstrates that the work is relevant to society as a whole. The folks writing that grant check feel good spending the money, because it can be tied to the public good. Some departments benefit more than other departments, but the folks going into art history know they're not in as hot a field as genomics. Universities do more than just teach students.

Try applying that sort of thinking to college athletics. You run into:

- the NCAA, which became a protectionist racket amidst fears that the evil new device called television would cause fans to stop attending games

- Title IX, which says that it's ok to not support art history as much as genomics, but no way do you sacrifice women's football for men's football.

and things get really fucked up. Yes, there has to be a certain amount of "protection" for studying unpopular subjects, be they women's football or art history -- that whole "universe" part of "university". But at the same time, big programs need to be nurtured in ways that make sense. At this stage, the big college football programs are the minor league of the NFL. Why not make that official? Why not get direct money from the NFL? Why not do things that make the product better for the NFL?

I just got the grade back on it. I got 1800 out of 2000 possible--a 90% A.

I am elated.
congrats :D

is there any particular reason this here? i mean, can we put this in the NCAA forum for all to read? if Unibomber wants to keep it here, then that's his choice, of course :)
By all means, move it to the NCAA forum. I just put it here because I said I would when I was gathering research.

As for the whole NFL thing, that's definitely where they're heading, but then college football is split into factions that will go to war amongst each other. Those that aren't "minor league" schools will want the money and the players, and the "minor league" schools will try to keep those schools from achieving their ends.

moved into NCAA forum......nice work, Unibomber.

Thanks, Matt. Much appreciation.

Guys, keep the feedback coming.